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Investor Relations and Firm Investment Efficiency 
ABSTRACT: We examine how the collection and dissemination of market intelligence by investor relations 
personnel (IRP) affects investment efficiency. We provide evidence that an increased flow of communication 
from investors to the board of directors, through IRP, is associated with more efficient investment decisions. 
Proprietary IR survey data illustrate IRP activities. We show that efficient investment decisions are positively 
associated with (1) the fraction of IRP time spent with existing and new institutional investors, (2) the number 
of one-on-one meetings between investors and IRP, and (3) IRP-board communication. Predictable 
associations between the type of IRP-board communication and investment efficiency corroborate our main 
result. In supplemental tests, we also find that a positive association between efficient investment and (1) IRP 
compensation and (2) IRP resources. Collectively, our evidence suggests that IRP play an important role as a 
conduit of market intelligence between investors and directors.  
Keywords: IR, market intelligence, investment efficiency 
JEL Classification: D82; D83; G11; G31 
Data Availability: IR data available from Bank of New York Mellon; other data publicly available. 
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The Impact of Market-Intelligence Acquisition and Reporting on Firm Investment Decisions 
 
1. Introduction 
We examine how the collection and dissemination of market intelligence by investor relations personnel 
(IRP) affects investment efficiency. IRP play an important role in collecting and circulating market intelligence 
to managers and the board of directors. Evidence that IRP push information out to the market is well 
documented (Karolyi and Liao, 2017; Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp, 2017). Yet, whether IRP also pull market 
intelligence into the firm is an unanswered question. Moreover, an open question is whether any intelligence 
gathering is incremental to or redundant with firms’ other intelligence gathering activities. In particular, ex ante, 
it is unclear if IRP activities are redundant with the board of directors own intelligence gathering activities. To 
address this empirical question, we examine the relationship between IRP activities and firm investment 
decisions. We predict and find that IRP activities improve management investment decisions. In doing so, we 
provide evidence on a governance role for IRP in facilitating the transmission of market feedback that 
influences firms’ investment decisions.  
Stiles and Taylor (2001) identify the board of directors as “…the link between the shareholders of the 
firm and the management entrusted with undertaking the day-to-day operations of the organization. A large 
number of studies (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976) have investigated how firms align the self-interest of 
management with the interests of outside shareholders. The board directors govern this relation (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Bagley, 2002). Board directors have two roles: (1) the advisory function (Williamson 1975; Fama 
and Jensen 1983) and the monitoring function (Fama 1980; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Monks and Minow 
2000). Shareholders must communicate their interests to the board of directors in order for directors to serve 
these two functions effectively. Few studies investigate the flow of communication from shareholders to the 
board of directors.1 No prior study, to the best of our knowledge, has investigated whether the acquisition of 
                                                 
1 Related prior studies have examined the effect of  board characteristics on firm outcomes (e.g., Brickley et al. 1994; 
Byrd and Hickman 1992; Subrahmanyan et al. 1997; Rosenstien and Wyatt 1990; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Lehn, 
Patro, and Zhao 2009) or the flow of  information from the firm to shareholders (Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp, 2017; 
Karolyi and Liao, 2017). 
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information from investors by IRP improves investment efficiency. As a result, Laksmana (2010) calls for future 
research investigating firm outcomes related to the flow of information  to the board of directors. 
We answer this call using proprietary archival data on the IR activities for 343 U.S. firms. Proprietary 
data is provided by BNY Mellon who administer the annual (bi-annual after 2013) Global Trends in Investor 
Relations Survey. Survey respondents are primarily the senior-most IR officer for their firm (Karolyi and Rose, 
2017) and survey responses provide unprecedented insight into otherwise unobservable IR activities. 
To examine the consequences of IR activities we focus on an important management function, the 
establishment and execution of an investment plan. We employ a Tobin’s q framework, which measures the 
sensitivities of firm level investment to Tobin’s q and cash flows from operation (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen 1988; Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 2003 McLean, Zhang, and Zhao 2012), and examine how the 
sensitivities of corporate investment to Tobin’s q and cash flows from operation vary with IR activities. Higher 
(lower) sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s q (cash flows from operation) indicates more efficient investment 
decisions. We expect that if IRP’s market intelligence acquisition and reporting activities help managers’ 
investment decisions then we will observe IR activities are positively (negatively) related to the sensitivity of 
investment to Tobin’s q (cash flows from operation).  
We first examine whether the fraction of IR time spent with existing, and new institutional investors 
and individual investors enhances investment efficiency. We find a robust positive association between IR time 
spent with existing and new institutional investors and investment efficiency. We find a much smaller but still 
economically significant positive association between IR time spent with individual investors and investment 
efficiency. This evidence is consistent with improved investment efficiency when IRP have more face time with 
outside investors. Evidence corroborating this inference is a positive association between the number of 
meetings IRP have with investment professionals and investment efficiency. Overall, our evidence supports 
the inference that intelligence gathering activities positively correlate with investment efficiency. IRP cannot 
ensure decision-making incorporates market intelligence, however, unless IRP can circulate the information to 
decision makers. This leads to our second set of empirical analyses.  
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We next examine the importance of reporting by IRP to the board of directors. Thakor (2016) suggests 
that efficient capital allocation decisions in line with investors’ needs requires strong corporate governance and 
oversight of management. The IR function within the firm has the potential to provide governance over market 
information acquisition by receiving and communicating the information from the market without the self-
interest issues that may be present if management received the information directly. We posit that providing 
information directly to the board of directors will reduce information asymmetry if management withholds 
information received from IRP from the board of directors. Managers may omit, obfuscate, or advantageously 
reframe such information if manager and board incentives are misaligned. We expect investment efficiency to 
improve to the extent that investor relation personnel mitigates information asymmetry by providing 
information directly to the board of directors.  
We investigate IRP’s role as a governance mechanism by examining whether communication between 
IRP and the board of directors improves investment efficiency. We first find a positive correlation between the 
delivery of information by IRP to the board of directors and investment efficiency. In related analyses, we show 
that the delivery of information correlates most strongly with investment efficiency when the information 
pertains to peer firm information, industry trends, IR activities, stock performance and financial performance. 
In contrast, we find investment efficiency is unchanged when delivered information pertains to sell side analyst 
opinions, media coverage of the firm or largest shareholder insights.  
Third, we also consider whether our results vary predictably in the cross-section. We expect that IR 
characteristics such as IRP resources, personnel talent and personnel experience accentuate the positive 
association between IR activities and investment efficiency. We first expect that resourceful IRP are more likely 
to obtain decision relevant information. We examine departmental budgets to test this prediction. We find 
strong univariate but weak multivariate evidence of a positive correlation between IR departmental budgets and 
investment efficiency. We next expect that more able and talented IRP are more likely to generate more accurate 
and timely decision-relevant information. We examine IR salary, bonus, total compensation and compensation 
as a fraction of the total IR budget to examine this prediction. We find that higher salaries and total 
compensation are uncorrelated with investment efficiency, but find a positive correlation between bonus size 
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and investment efficiency, and between compensation as a fraction of the IR budget and investment efficiency. 
This evidence suggests that talented IRP generate larger information intermediary benefits for their employer. 
Lastly, we expect that more experienced IR professionals are more likely to have skill in collecting and 
circulating market intelligence. We employ the number of years’ experience of the survey respondent to test 
this prediction. We find no correlation between experience and investment efficiency.  
The purpose of our study is to provide a descriptive analysis capturing the associations between investor 
relation activities, as documented by a newly available data set, and investment efficiency. Our study is subject 
to many limitations. First, the investment efficiency literature is large, and populated by alternative models that 
predict efficient investment. To address concerns that our results are model dependent, we re-estimate all of 
our empirical tests using two alternative investment efficiency models. We report these results in Appendix 1–
10. These results corroborate our main results.  
Second, while we do not argue causality, we note a correlated omitted variable could spuriously generate 
the associations we observe. Plausible candidates are board characteristics, such as board size, independence, 
cooption, and busyness. It is plausible that these characteristics drive both the level of IR activity and investment 
efficiency. To address this concern we re-estimate our main tests after including proxies for each of the forgoing 
variables. We report these results in Appendix 10-15. These results corroborate our main results.  Finally, we 
re-estimate our models using firm fixed effects to address further the threat of a spurious correlation between 
IR activities and investment efficiency. We report these results in Appendix 16–20. These results corroborate 
the results we report in our main tables. 
We believe that our study provides two important contributions to the literature examining the 
determinants and consequences of IR activities. First, while previous studies have documented the 
consequences of information provided from IRP on the decisions of investors (e.g., Brown et al., 2017; Karolyi and 
Rose, 2017), no prior study has investigated whether the acquisition of information from investors and the 
subsequent circulation to the board of directors affects firm outcomes. The National Investor Relations 
Institute even defines the IR function as a strategic management responsibility to enable effective two-way 
communication, however, academic literature until now has largely ignored the importance of information 
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inflow to the firm (NIRI, 2014). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) raise the important question concerning the 
acquisition of information from investors “How do managers know what’s in shareholders’ interest?” To fill 
this gap we examine the impact of IR activities on a firm outcome of tremendous consequence, investment 
efficiency. Our study is the first to document the integral role IR plays in transmitting shareholder interests to 
firm decision-makers.  
Second, we identify the impact of reporting information from shareholders directly to the board of 
directors to reduce information asymmetry and improve the quality of investment decisions. Thakor (2016) 
suggests that efficient capital allocation decisions in line with investors’ needs requires strong corporate 
governance and oversight of management. Our evidence suggests that the IR function has the potential to play 
a governance role by facilitating information acquisition and circulation to the board of directors. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and develop our 
hypotheses. In Section 3, we provide our research design and in Section 4 we discuss our sample development 
and summary statistics. Section 5 provides empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. IRP and the collection and reporting of market intelligence 
IRP play an important informational role for corporations as they serve as the primary conduit of 
information between the firm and investors. Prior studies have primarily focused on IR role in pushing 
messages from the firm to the capital markets. Using data from the National IR Institute (NIRI), Bushee and 
Miller (2012) document that the use of external IR experts increases institutional ownership, analyst following 
and media coverage. Green et al (2014) document that the increased IR activity proxied by the number of 
brokers hosting a firm is correlated with increased institutional investing. Lang and Lundholm (1996) document 
greater analyst following and forecast accuracy and reduced likelihood of large forecast revisions are associated 
with increased IR activity. Karolyi and Liao (2017) use a new and proprietary data set based on the 2012 data 
from the Bank of New York Mellon annual/bi-annual IR survey to document a number of important market 
outcomes related to IR activity, including increased analyst following, analyst accuracy and lower cost of capital.  
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All of these studies focus on the improved quality and quantity of information communicated to the 
market from the firm by IRP and their activities. However, interviews of IR managers by Roberts et al. (2006) 
document that contact between IRP and institutional investors result in useful information being brought into 
the firm in addition to information being flowed out of the firm to investors. The importance of the two-way 
communication in IR though understudied by academics has long been understood by practitioners. Ng Lay 
San, vice-president of Group Corporation Relations at Sembcorp Industries states “As engagement is a two-
way dialogue, an effective IR function will also be the "eyes and ears" of the company, providing valuable 
insights on market sentiment to the board and senior management” (Shying, 2017). Additionally, Lynette Leong, 
CEO of CapitaLand Commercial Trust Management states “An effective IR team not only engages its 
stakeholders with timely unbiased and transparent communications, but encourages questions and feedback” 
(Shying, 2017). Although anecdotal evidence suggests that firms see value in IR collection and circulation of 
market intelligence, the impact of market intelligence collection on managers’ various decisions is an unexplored 
question. Particularly, we focus on its impact on managers’ investment decisions since investments are central 
to future firm performance and firm value. 
2.2. Information and managers’ investment decision 
Previous studies have investigated a number of factors that faciltate efficient capital allocation decisions 
(e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 2003; Rauh 2006; Asker, Fare-Mensa, 
and Ljunqgvist 2015). Some studies infer that higher quality information helps management to improve the 
quality of their investment decisions. For example, Biddle and Hilary (2006) reason that firms with better 
accounting quality tend to have more efficient capital investment decision since higher quality accounting 
information reduces information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital. They predict 
and find that accounting quality is negatively associated with investment inefficiency.  
Related prior studies (e.g., Biddle et al. 2009) assert that managers drive reductions in information 
asymmetry between firm insiders and shareholders. In contrast, we expect investors improve investment 
efficiency by providing feedback on investment proposals. Calls for management to better represent the interest 
of investors is one example of shareholder intervention that influences management decisions. Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1997) raise the question concerning the acquisition of information from investors “How do managers 
know what’s in shareholders’ interest?” To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have investigated 
how firms acquire information from market participants and how the information collected from market 
participants impacts the efficiency of their investment decisions. We attempt to fill this void in the literature by 
examining how IRP communicate with market participants using proxies such as IRP’s contact time with 
investors and the frequency of one-on-one meetings with investment professionals. If IRP collect high quality 
information from market participants and deliver such information to managers and the board of directions to 
mitigate information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, then we will observe a positive relation 
between these proxies and investment efficiency. This leads to our first hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H1: Interaction between IRP and investors positively relates with investment efficiency. 
 
2.3. Board of directors and management oversight  
There remains uncertainty that even if information from market participants is communicated to 
management, management may not act on it. Levit and Malenko (2011) provide evidence that even when 
managers know shareholders’ intentions they may not act on it unless they assess there is a possibility of being 
disciplined by the shareholders. After reviewing research from a number of different theoretical perspectives 
on the balancing of management’s self-interest and the interests of the shareholders, Baysinger et al. (1991) 
conclude that when shareholders lack the ability to verify whose interest management is serving, management 
tends to favor their own. To reduce management’s self-serving bias and promote efficient capital allocation 
decisions in line with investors’ needs requires strong corporate governance and oversight of management 
(Thakor 2016).  
Laksmana (2008) highlights that the governance process is essential for effective decision making. The 
board of directors has a primary responsibility of oversight of a firm’s long-term investment strategy (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). Mckinsey & Company (2016) report that highly rated boards spend more time evaluating 
investment selections and are more effective at regularly reviewing potential capital expenditures. Additionally, 
McKinsey & Company (2016) report that effective boards are twice as likely as ineffective boards to seek out 
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relevant information beyond what management provides to deepen their knowledge. Duchin et al. (2010) 
identify that board of director effectiveness is dependent on whether board of directors is successful in reducing 
information asymmetry between management and stakeholders. To the extent that information gathered by 
IRP provides insights into shareholders’ interests, the information may be of interest to both management and 
the board of directors.  
The board of directors may have great interest in market intelligence collected by IRP. Knowing 
shareholders preferences is a prerequisite to holding management accountable. While discussing Intel, Skroupa 
(2017) explains how investors’ demands change over time and how the company has benefited from investor 
feedback. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the separation of management from financing agents naturally 
creates asymmetric information. The board of directors provides oversight of management and builds links 
with investors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). However, Jensen (1993) argues that CEOs usually determine the 
agenda and the information received by the board. Any omission, obstruction or reframing of information 
hinders the ability of board members to effectively monitor and evaluate CEOs. Directors surveyed by Nowak 
and McCabe (2003) also provide evidence on the asymmetric flow of information flow between management 
and the board of directors, highlighting that CEOs have the controlling power over information. 2 Their 
surveyed findings also suggest that the provision of appropriate information for the board of directors is 
essential for directors to fulfill their role in corporate governance. 
Previous studies such as Raheja (2005), Harris and Raviv (2008) and Duchin et al. (2010) also highlight 
the importance of reducing information asymmetry between those involved in the day-to-day management of 
the firm (insiders) and directors to improve board effectiveness. In order to reduce the information asymmetry, 
Klein (1998) suggests that “boards need specialized and expert provided information about the firm’s activities 
to evaluate and ratify the firm’s long-term strategies.” Lipton and Lorsch (1992) identify that one of the 
impediments to effective boards is the complexity of the matters that directors must understand and discuss. 
                                                 
2 Some comments they receive are as follows: “You are absolutely at the mercy of  the Chief  Executive and management 
and you rely on them enormously to give you the information you need to base decisions on.” “Chief  Executives…even 
the good ones…tend to want to control the flow of  information” 
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Therefore, to assess if a long-term investment is in the best interest of the shareholders, directors not only need 
to receive information from the market but also need to understand it.  
Provision of market intelligence by the IR function directly to the board of directors should reduce the 
information asymmetry between management and the board concerning shareholders’ interests and lead to 
improved investment decisions. Felton and Watson (2002) suggest that there is value in a direct line of 
communication between IRP and board directors. In their survey, one director reflected that, “(k)ey managers 
should report regularly to committees, answer the questions of their members and educate them on specific 
situations and area they wish to investigate.” Another states, “[w]hen core board processes are reevaluated, the 
concerns of the very largest investors should be considered”.  
On the contrary, Jensen (1993, p. 850) suggests that shareholders’ interests may not matter at all, as 
shareholder activism is grounded in the legal system and “the legal/political/regulatory system is far too blunt 
an instrument to handle the problems of wasteful management behavior effectively”. Consistent with this 
conjecture, Dulewitz and Hebert (2004) find no evidence that taking account of the legitimate interests of 
shareholders has an impact on firm performance. Therefore, market intelligence may have little impact on 
management’s investment decision even if it is directly reported to the board of directors. In sum, it is an 
empirical question whether their ability to monitor managers’ investment decisions is are impacted by directly 
receiving market intelligence from IRP. This leads to our second set of hypotheses: 
H2: Direct interaction between IRP and the board of directors positively relates with investment efficiency. 
 
2.4. IRP characteristics and investment efficiency  
We also consider the following IR characteristics such as IRP resources, IRP compensation, and IR 
professionals’ experience and examine how such characteristics help to create more effective governance of 
long term investment decisions by providing more useful information in reducing information asymmetry 
between management and stakeholders. We first argue that the board of directors with more resourceful IRP 
are more likely to obtain such information since resourceful IRP have better and more frequent access to market 
intelligence and receive stronger administrative support. Collecting market intelligence is costly and consumes 
company resources. If an IRP does not have enough resources for the collection of market intelligence, it is 
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unlikely to provide decision-relevant information to the board of directors. Analogously, Clement (1999) 
predicts and finds that earnings forecasts issued by stock analysts with more resources are more accurate. 
We also expect that more able and talented IRP professionals are more likely to provide more timely 
and relevant information for investment decision to the board of directors due to their performance in 
collecting market intelligence. Although we cannot directly observe IR professionals’ ability and talent, we may 
observe it based on the assumption that an efficient labor market will pay more wages and compensations to 
more able and talented IR specialists. Thus, we use forms of compensation as proxies for IRP talent.  
Lastly, we also hypothesize that more experienced IR professionals are more likely to have better skill 
in collecting more useful market intelligence for investment decision and better reporting them to the board of 
directors. We also argue that IR professionals’ ability and talent also can improve with their experience, also 
resulting in better collection and delivery of the market intelligence to the boards. Analogously, Clement (1999) 
predicts and finds that earnings forecasts issued by stock analysts with more experience are more accurate. This 
leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: IRP resources, and IRP ability and experience positively relate with investment efficiency. 
 
 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1. Data 
Consistent with Karolyi and Liao (2017), we rely on proprietary IR data from the Bank of New York 
Mellon Global Trends in Investor Relations survey. The survey was performed annually by Bank of New York 
Mellon from 2004 to 2013 and biannually afterwards. Our sample is comprised of respondents to the 5th 
through 10th editions of the survey administered between 2009 and 2015, inclusive.  
Survey respondents are primarily the senior-most IR officials within their companies. The sampled 
firms in all surveys include both customer and non-customer firms of Bank of New York Mellon. Karolyi and 
Liao (2017) estimate that less than 10% of the 2012 sample are Bank of New York Mellon customers. Overall, 
survey respondents represent many industries. The respondents per year range from 270 in 2009 to 817 in 2012. 
The surveys were conducted between July and September of each year, with the exception of 2015 which was 
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administered between February and April of 2015, and the 2009 survey which was administered in October to 
November of 2008. The response rates for the survey range from approximately 7.8% in 2015 to 17.5% in 
2011. These response rates are comparable to previous studies that have surveyed high-level corporate 
executives. For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) attained a response rate of 9% sampling CFOs and 
Lisowsky et al (2016) attained a response rate of 8.1% sampling senior tax executives. While we examine only 
U.S. firms, survey respondents hail from 63 different countries. 
Each edition of the survey contains a block of core questions asked annually as well as a series of 
topical questions, which may vary from edition to edition. The surveys ranged from 55 questions in 2013 to 79 
questions in both 2009 and 2011. During our sample period, we provided feedback and design suggestions to 
the Bank of New York Mellon concerning the survey. The questions are designed to gain insights into the 
firm’s IR activities and strategies for the prior year. All but a few questions are multiple choice. 
Linking public firms named in the BNY Mellon Global Trends in Investor Relations Survey data to 
public firms named in Compustat North America involves several steps. First, we identify the company 
recorded in BNY Mellon panel. Second, we use a matching algorithm to match the name of the company with 
a list of publicly traded company names from Compustat. Our matching algorithm strips common strings (e.g., 
“Inc.,” “Ltd.”), punctuation and spaces from firm names in both databases before comparing the two data 
strings. Third, the algorithm compares each company name in the BNY Mellon data panel to each company 
name in Compustat. Each consecutive letter of every name pair – one from the BNY Mellon Survey, the other 
from Compustat – is analyzed, and a similarity score ranging from zero to one is computed where the score is 
zero if no letters match and one if all letters match. Fourth, the algorithm generates a list of matches from 
highest to lowest score. Finally, we retain all matches with a score in excess of 0.3 and hand-check each match 
to confirm correct matches and remove erroneous matches.3 
                                                 
3 For example, “Advanced Energy Industries, Inc.” in the FEC database is stripped of common words, abbreviations, 
spaces and punctuation to be read by the computer as “AdvancedEnergy.” This truncated string is matched to Compustat 
name “Advanced Energy Inds Inc.,” which is read by the computer as “AdvancedEnergyInds.” The match score is 
imperfect at 0.764 due to the absence of character match on the final four characters in the Compustat firm name. 
However, because the score is above 0.3, we manually check and confirm the match for inclusion in our sample.  
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To test our hypothesis, we examine firm responses to the following six questions. The first two 
questions capture variations in the collection effort of market information by IRP from market participants. 
The next two questions capture variations in the extent to which IRP has a channel by which they can deliver 
gathered information to the board of directors. The final two questions capture variations in IRP resources and 
IRP ability and experience.  
The first question we examine is, "(P)lease think about all the time spent with the investment 
community by IRP, approximately what percentage of this time is allocated to existing (new) institutional 
investors [individual investors].” Surveyed firms respond to this question by inputting the percentage of IRP 
time spent meeting i) existing institutional investors, ii) new/prospective institutional investors, iii) individual 
investors. Since it is answered by the percentage, the responses ranges between 0 and 1 (100%) for each category. 
Table 1 shows that the average (median) time spent with existing institutional investors (Time_ExistingII) by 
IRP is 34.83% (35%). We also find that the average (median) time spent with new/prospective institutional 
investors, Time_NewII is 27.67% (30%). Interestingly, the amount of time spent for individual investors is 
minimal. The average value of Time_Individuals is only 1.9%, consistent with few returns to meeting with 
counterparties whose holdings, on average, are small. 
The second question we examine is, “(W)hat is your best estimate as to the number of one-on-one 
meetings IRP have with investment professionals in a typical year.” Surveyed firms respond to this question by 
specifying actual numeric estimate. The average (median) response to this question is 72.32 (2). We expect that 
a greater number of meetings between IRO and investors is a source of investor insights that when passed 
along to the board of directors will improve investment selection.  
The third question we examine is, "(d)o IRP provide the Board of Directors with market intelligence?" 
Surveyed firms respond to this question by specifying “Yes” or “No”. We code an affirmative (negative) 
response as “1” (“0”). An affirmative response is reported by 37% of firms. We expect greater investment 
efficiency when IRP provide the board of directors with market intelligence.  
The fourth question we examine is “(w)hat type(s) of market intelligence does IRP provide to the 
Board of Directors?" The survey provides a wide variety of responses capturing the various types of feedback 
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and further asks about the frequency of the reports to the board of directors. The types of market intelligence 
considered by the survey include stock performance, sell side analyst opinions, peer information, media 
mentions, investment community feedback, industry trends, financial performance, insights on largest buyer, 
and upcoming and past IR activities. We code a variable for each of the foregoing types of market intelligence. 
If IRP do not provide that type of market intelligence to the board, we code the variable as zero. If IRP provides 
that type of market intelligence to the board, we also measure the frequency of each type supplied to the board 
of directors. We code the variable as one when IR supplies market intelligence to the board only as needed. We 
code the variable as two, three, four, five, six, and seven when supplied annually, semi-annually, quarterly, 
monthly, weekly, and daily, respectively. The average of the variable across each of the nine types of market 
intelligence ranges from a low of 0.12 (for media mentions) to a high of 5.56 (sell side analyst opinions).  
The fifth question we examine is, “(w)hat is the level of IR compensation and resources?”. Survey 
respondents, who are generally the senior-most IRP at the firm, provide information on their base salary, bonus 
size, total compensation, the total IRP budget and the proportion of the annual budget allocated to salaries. 
The average compensation for IRP responding to the survey is $192,020. The average bonus is $71,790. The 
average total compensation in our sample is $300,320. The average IR departmental budget is $914,790 and the 
proportion of the annual budget spent on IR salaries averages 44%. These variables are log-transformed in our 
analysis. While our main hypothesis calls for the test of information flows between investors and IRP and 
between IRP and board directors, we examine IRP wages as a proxy for IRP ability and talent in their 
communication role. The last question we examine is, "(H)ow many years of experience does your most senior 
IR-dedicated professional have in the IR field?” Surveyed firms respond to this question by specifying the 
number of years. The average (median) experience of the most senior IR professional is 9.80 (8) years.  
For each of the aforementioned variables, we autofill missing values with non-missing values from the 
most proximate firm-year to generate a balanced panel of observations. This research design decision affects 
2014 in particular, because there was no survey distributed by BNY Mellon in 2014. BNY Mellon transitioned 
from an annual to a bi-annual survey after 2013.  
3.2. Research Design 
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Our research question asks whether the flow of communication from investors to board of directors 
via IRP improves investment efficiency. To examine the association between IR activities and investment 
efficiency, we estimate the investment model (1) developed in the prior literature (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988), 
Baker et al. (2003), McLean et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2017)). This literature suggests that firm investment 
decisions are more efficient when the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s q is higher or the sensitivity of 
investment to internal cash flows is lower in the model. For example, Biddle and Hilary (2006) show that firms 
with higher accounting quality tend to have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity and use this as evidence for 
more efficient investment decision. Thus, we also interpret the significant and positive (negative) coefficient on 
q (cash flows from operation) as more efficient investment decision by managers. To examine whether the 
informational flow from investors to board of directors through IRP activities increases investment efficiency, 
we further interact both q and cash flows from operation with our IR variables. McLean et al. (2012) employ a 
similar research design to examine the effect of investor protection on investment efficiency and find that the 
coefficients on the interactions of investor protection measures with Tobin’s q are significantly positive while 
the coefficients on the interaction of investor protection measures with internal cash flows are significantly 
negative, concluding that country level investor protection increases investment efficiency. 
 INVESTi,t = ß0 + ß1qi,t-1 + ß2CFi,t-1+ ß3IRi,t-1+ ß4IRi,t-1*qi,t-1 + ß5IRi,t-1*CFi,t-1 + ß6…nXit + εi,t  (1) 
where,  
INVEST =  a measure of investment; It is measured as capital expenditure plus R&D expenditure scaled 
by average total assets.4  
q =  The natural logarithm of Tobin’s q, which is computed as the market value of equity minus 
the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets 
(e.g., Baker et al. 2003);  
CF =  Net income plus R&D and depreciation and amortization, all scaled by the lagged total assets;  
                                                 
4 We discuss alternate measures in our robustness section. 
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IR =  IR variables; IR is equal to one of a menu of variables capturing IRP activity that we draw 
from the BNY Mellon IR Survey;  
Xit represents a vector of control variables including firm size, Altman-Z score, property plant and equipment, 
book leverage, cash flows, operating cycle, a loss indicator, and the 3-year standard deviation of cash flows, 
sales and investment. We define all control variables in Appendix A. 
Our primary focus is on the coefficients on the interactions of IR variables with the lagged Tobin’s q 
(q) and cash flows from operation (CF). We expect that the coefficients on the interactions of IR variables with 
q (CF) are significantly positive (negative) if IRP increases investment efficiency by facilitating the flow of 
communication between shareholders and board directors. We include various control variables which prior 
studies suggest that affect managers’ investment decision in the equation (1) such as firm size, standard 
deviations of cash flows from operation, sales, and investments, Altman Z-core, the amount of property, plant, 
and equipment, leverage, operating cycle, and accounting loss occurrences. For example, we include the amount 
of property, plant, and equipment as a proxy for tangibility since prior studies (e.g., Biddle et al. 2009) document 
that more capital-intensive firms tend to make greater investments. The literature also shows that leverage is 
negatively related to firm level investment. When estimating equation (1), we cluster standard errors by firm. 
4. Sample development and Summary Statistics 
4.1. Sample development 
Table 2 shows the number of survey observations throughout our data screening process, starting with 
data retrieval and ending with our estimation sample. We retrieve survey responses for 2,518 distinct firms over 
3,334 firm-years. Survey responses span 2009 to 2015. Survey questions are retrospective so we match survey 
data with firm data from the previous year. For example, Starbucks Corporation was a 2013 survey respondent. 
We attribute survey responses for this firm to firm-year data from 2012.  
Removing duplicate observations excludes 109 (0) firm-years (firms). Removing company names that 
were not matched to Compustat excludes 480 (409) firm-year (firm) observations. Removing non-U.S. 
observations excludes 2,313 (1,751) firm-year (firm) observations. Our final screen removes observations with 
missing control variables. After these data screens the sample comprises 412 (343) firm-years (firms).  
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At the data retrieval stage it is clear that the majority of firms respond to the BNY Mellon Global 
Trends in Investor Relations Survey only once during the sample period. On average, a 2010 survey respondent 
did not respond in any other year in our sample. To create a balanced panel, we replace missing survey responses 
with the most temporally proximate same-firm non-missing survey response. Iterating this process over the 
343 distinct survey respondents in our sample increases our sample size from 412 firm-year observations to 
1,895 firm-year observations. We estimate model (1) using this expanded sample.  
Panel A of Table 3 provides an industry breakdown of our sample. We report industry using the Fama-
French 10 classification for both the raw survey data and for our expanded sample. Industry composition across 
both samples are similar. The highest represented industry is the high-tech industry with 24% of the 
observations and the lowest is the telecommunications industry with 2% of the observations. 
Panel B of Table 3 provides a year breakdown of our sample. We report the breakdown for both the 
raw survey data and for our expanded sample. The raw data includes survey responses for consecutive years 
2009 to 2015. In 2014, BNY Mellon transition to a bi-annual survey and so the next available survey responses 
were gathered in 2015. As mentioned above, we assign survey responses to the firm-year preceding survey 
administration. Our year breakdown shows the number of survey responses varied significantly from year-to-
year. BNY Mellon gathered approximately 32% of raw data in 2011. BNY Mellon gathered the fewest 
observations, approximately 8% of the raw data, in 2008. Our expanded sample mechanically generates a 
smooth distribution of observations across sample years because any year with a missing survey response takes 
on the value of the most temporally proximate same-firm non-missing survey response. We describe sample 
characteristics and estimate our empirical models using the expanded sample throughout the rest of our study.  
4.2. Summary statistics 
 Table 4 provides the summary statistics for the sample. Investment, our dependent variable, captures the 
level of capital and research and development expenditures incurred by the firm in each firm-year. The average 
(median) firm spends 9% (7%) of total assets on new capital expenditures and research and development. Other 
firm characteristics, including leverage, property, plant and equipment, cash flows, operating cycle and a loss 
indicator are generally consistent with sample characteristics of the Compustat universe of firms. The average 
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(median) Altman Z-score in our sample is 2.20 (2.22) while the average (median) value of the amount of 
property, plant, and equipment to total assets is 29% (18%). On average, our sample firm’s book leverage is 
25%.  
5. Results 
5.1 Main Results 
5.1.1 IR Communication with Investors 
 We first examine how IRP time spent with investors affects investment efficiency. We consider three 
different groups of investors – existing institutional investors, new institutional investors, and individual 
investors and measure the amount of time spent with each group of investment community. This leads to the 
following three variables of our interest – TIME_ExistingII (time spent with existing institutional investors), 
TIME_NewII (time spent with new institutional investors), and TIME_Individuals (time spent with individual 
investors). We predict that the likelihood that IRP can obtain more relevant information for their firm’s 
investment decision is higher when they spend more time with investment community. Thus, we expect that 
there is a positive relation between IRP time with investors and investment efficiency. To test this, we estimate 
the model (1) by interacting each of the above three time variables (TIME_ExistingII, TIME_NewII, and 
TIME_Individuals) with both Tobin’s q and cash flow.  
Results are presented in Table 5. We report the results with or without control variables such as firm 
size, leverage, Altman Z-score, and a loss indicator. Since prior studies relying on the traditional q-framework 
do not usually include control variables, we also report the results without control variables for the purpose of 
comparison. When we use the amount of time spent with existing institutional investors (i.e., TIME_ExistingII) 
as a measure of IRP’s communication with investors, the coefficient on the interaction term between Tobin’s 
q (cash flow) and TIME_ExistingII is significantly positive (negative). These results support our hypothesis that 
more interaction between IRP personnel and investors is positively related with investment efficiency. We find 
similar results when using the amount of time spent with new institutional investors (i.e., TIME_NewII) as a 
measure of IRP’s communication with investors. The smaller coefficient and lower level of statistical 
significance may suggest that IR appears to be getting better information from incumbent rather than 
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prospective investors. Intuitively, incumbent investors incur more information gathering costs and hence are 
more likely to have valuable feedback to provide to the firm. When we interact TIME_Individuals (the amount 
of time spent with individual investors) with both Tobin’s q and cash flow, the coefficient on the interaction 
between TIME_Individuals and Tobin’q is positive and statistically significant while the coefficient on the 
interaction between TIME_Individuals and cash flow is negative and statistically significant. These coefficients 
suggest that even IRP’s contact with individual investors helps to improve investment efficiency.  
Turning to control variables, we find that Tobin’s Q, cash flows, standard deviation of cash flows, the 
amount of property, plant, and equipment, and the operating cycle are positively related to the amount of 
investment while size, Altman-Z, leverage are negatively related to the amount of investment. These results are 
generally consistent with prior studies, such as Biddle et al. (2012). 
Next, we examine the impact of one-on-one meetings with investment professions on firm investment 
efficiency. Based on our hypothesis, we predict that the opportunities for IRP to collect market intelligence 
through one-on-one meetings with investment professions will enhance investment efficiency. Consistent with 
our prediction, the results in Table 6 show that the coefficient on the interaction between Tobin’ q and this IR 
activity variable is significantly positive, suggesting that information from meetings between IRP and 
investment professionals significantly increases the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s q. We find no 
association between these meetings and the relation between cash flows and investment. Overall, the evidence 
is consistent with H1, which predicts that increased opportunities to collect market intelligence via contact with 
investors is associated with more efficient investment decisions.  
5.1.2 IR Communication with the Board of Directors  
 
 H2 suggests that in addition to being a conduit of market intelligence IRP may play a role as a 
governance mechanism by insuring that market intelligence collected from investors is free of self-serving bias 
and decision relevant to board of directors. To test this hypothesis, in our main regression, we interact Tobin’s 
q and cash flow variables with a dummy variable indicating whether market intelligence is reported directly to 
the board of directors by IRP. If direct reporting of market intelligence to the board of directors has a positive 
impact on the efficiency of investment decisions, the coefficient on the interaction term between Tobin’s q 
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(cash flow) and a dummy variable will be significantly positive (negative). Results presented in Table 7 are 
consistent with our prediction. The coefficient on the interaction term with Tobin’s q is significantly positive, 
suggesting that greater access to market intelligence directly by the board of directors is associated with greater 
investment efficiency.  
  We further investigate how investment efficiency varies with specific forms of market intelligence that 
may be provided by the IR function directly to the board of directors. We consider the following types of 
market intelligence: stock performance, sell side analyst opinion, peer firm information, media mentions, 
investment community feedback, industry trends, financial performance, and largest buyer insights, and 
debriefing IR activities. Consistent with our previous analysis, we expect that such information directly reported 
to the board of directors significantly help them to understand firm-specific, industry-specific, and macro-
economic conditions and more efficiently monitor managers’ investment decisions.  
Again, to test this prediction, we add each type of market intelligence and interact it with Tobin’s q and 
cash flows. Results presented in Table 8 are generally consistent with our prediction that most types of market 
intelligence increase investment efficiency. We find that the interaction terms between types of market 
intelligence and Tobin’s q (cash flows) are significantly positive (negative). Specifically, the coefficients on the 
interaction terms between Tobin’s q and the following variables are positive and statistically significant: stock 
performance, sell-side analyst opinions, peer firm information, industry trends, financial performance, and IR 
activities debrief. These results suggest the relation between IR communication and investment efficiency is 
conditional on the type of information provided to the board of directors. We also find that coefficients on the 
interactions between cash flow and the following variables are significantly negative: stock performance, sell 
side analyst opinions, peer firm information, industry trends and financial performance. These results further 
suggest that the relation between IR communication and investment efficiency is conditional on the type of 
information provided to the board of directors.  
5.1.3 IR resources, compensation and experience 
 
 We also examine how IRP resources and personnel compensation affect firm investment efficiency. 
Our measure of IRP resources is the IR budget. We measure IRP compensation in four ways such as base 
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salary, bonus, total compensation, salaries as percentage of IR budget. Base salary, bonus, and total 
compensation to IRP are measured relative to total firm assets. Salaries as percentage of IR budget is measured 
as the percentage of the IR departmental budget allocated to IRP. We argue that IRP is more likely to provide 
more timely and relevant information for investment decision to the board of directors when they can utilize 
more company resources and IRP is more able and talented. We use salary and compensation variables as 
proxies for IRP ability and talent. To test this, again, we add such resources and compensation measures and 
interact them with both Tobin’s q and cash flows. If IRP resources and personnel compensations help IRP to 
acquire and report high quality market intelligence to the board of directors and thus increase managers’ 
investment decision, the coefficients on the interaction terms with Tobin’s q (cash flows) will be significantly 
positive (negative).  
Results are presented in Table 9. Consistent with our predictions, the coefficients on Bonus and Tobin’s 
q are significantly positive. We also find that the coefficients on the interaction terms between Bonus and cash 
flow are significantly negative, suggesting IR personnel ability and talents increase investment efficiency. When 
we use salaries as percentage of IR budget as a proxy for the extent of IRP resources, we also find that the 
coefficient on its interaction term with Tobin’q is significantly positive. However, the coefficient on its 
interaction term with cash flow is negative, but not significant. Overall, our results in Table 9 confirm the 
positive impact of IR resources and compensations on investment efficiency. Tests examining the total IR 
budget weakly support our hypothesis. We find that both coefficients on the interaction terms between total 
IR budget and Tobin’s q (cash flows) are positive (negative), but only statistically significant in the model 
without control variables.  
Finally, we examine how the experience of IRP affects investment efficiency. To measure IRP 
experience, we use the number of years of experience of the most senior IR-dedicated professional. Then we 
interact the variable, IR_YEAR with Tobin’s q and cash flows. We find that the coefficient on the interaction 
term between IR_YEAR and Tobin’s q (cash flows from operation) is statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
more experienced IR professionals are not associated with greater investment efficiency.  
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In sum, we show that investment decisions of the firm are more efficient when the firm has greater 
access to market intelligence via their IR function. Our results also suggest that firm’s investment decisions are 
more efficient when board of directors are provided more direct access to market intelligence via IRP and when 
IRP provides the board of directors with specific forms of market intelligence. Finally, we also document that 
IR resources and IRP ability help managers and the board of directors to improve investment efficiency. 
5.2 Robustness Tests 
5.2.1 Results based on alternative measures of investment  
Alternate measures of the level of investment are used in the prior literature. For example, Chen, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami and Wang (2017) measure investment as the level of research and development expenditures 
plus the change in property plant and equipment plus the change inventory. Alternatively, Bhandari and 
Javakhadze (2017) measure investment as research and development expenditures plus the change in property 
plant and equipment. We re-estimate our tests using these alternate measures. We tabulate results using the 
Chen et al. (2017) measure of investment in Tables A1-A5. We tabulate results using the Bhandari and 
Javakhadze (2017) measure in Tables A6-A10. Results under the alternative specifications are very similar to 
those reported in our main analysis.  
5.2.2 Results with controls for the effect of board characteristics 
In this section, we also examine whether other board characteristics affect our results. It is plausible 
that firms with better monitoring provided by the board of directors tend to have more IR activities in terms 
of collecting market intelligence. At the same time, due to better monitoring by the board of directors, such 
firms may have more efficient investment decisions, potentially resulting in the positive relation between IR 
activities and investment efficiency. To mitigate this concern, we add the following board characteristics to our 
model: board size, board independence, co-opted board members, and board director busyness (e.g., Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen 2014) and examine whether our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. Board 
data is drawn from the Institutional Shareholder Services database.  Specifically, we add board size and board 
independence variables and interact them with Tobin’s q and cash flows from operation in our main regression. 
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We find that our results are qualitatively similar with those controls, suggesting that our results are not driven 
by such board characteristics. 
5.2.3 Results with firm fixed effects 
In this section, we also examine whether firm fixed effects affect our results. Firm fixed effects control 
for time-invariant firm unobservables that may drive both IR behavior and investment efficiency. Survey 
responses reported by firms who respond to the BNY Mellon Global Trends in Investor Relations Survey in 
only one year are subsumed when we use firm fixed effects because the IR variable, like other time-invariant 
firm unobservables, does not vary over time. Consequently, the results we report with this test reflect variation 
in investment efficiency following from within-firm over-time changes in IR variables. We find that our results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in prior tests, suggesting that time-invariant firm unobservables do 
not drive our results.  
6. Conclusion 
We investigate the IR function as a conduit of decision relevant and independent market intelligence 
into the firm. We provide evidence that increased opportunities for IRP to draw market intelligence into the 
firm are associated with more efficient investment decisions. We also provide evidence that market intelligence 
directly reported to the board of directors is associated with more efficient investment decisions, suggesting 
that market intelligence reported by IRP to the board of directors may improve their ability to monitor 
management’s investment decisions. Lastly, we also provide evidence that IR resources and IRP ability and 
talents positively affect firm investment efficiency.  
 Readers should note that the data in this study are subject to some notable limitations. Firstly, 
significant data was collected via a survey of the clients of the Bank of New York Mellon and therefore is not 
a random sample and may not be representative of all firms. Secondly, as the survey required self-reporting it 
is subject to potential bias or error that we are not able to verify. Nonetheless, we believe that this study provides 
novel evidence that IR play an important role in not only pushing firm messages to capital markets, but also in 
collecting and then circulating market intelligence from capital markets inside the firms. Future research 
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providing richer detail of alternative decisions, market information and market sources would all be beneficial 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Test Variables 
Time_ExistingII IRP time spent with existing investors.  BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Time_NewII IRP time spent with new investors.  BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Time_Individuals IRP time spent with individual 
investors.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Meetings_with_IRO  The number of meetings between the 
IRO and investment professionals 
scaled by shareholders equity. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
boardwmarketintelligence 
 
An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides the board with market 
intelligence.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Stock Performance  An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides stock performance 
information to the board.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Sell Side Analyst Opinions  An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides sell side analyst opinion 
information to the board. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Peer Firm Information  An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides peer firm information to 
the board. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Media Mentions  An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides media mention 
information to the board. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Investment Community Feedback  An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides investment community 
feedback to the board. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Industry Trends 
 
An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides industry trend 
information to the board. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Financial Performance  An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides financial performance 
information to the board. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Largest Buyer Insights 
 
An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides insights on the largest 
shareholder to the board. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Debriefing IR Activities An indicator variable capturing whether 
IRP provides information to the board 
on upcoming and past IR activities.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Base Salary The level of base salary for the survey 
respondent scaled by total firm assets.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Bonus The level of bonus for the survey 
respondent scaled by total firm assets.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Total Compensation The level of total compensation for the 
survey respondent scaled by total firm 
assets. 
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Total IR Budget The size of the total budget for IRP, 
scaled by total firm assets.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
30 
 
Salaries as % of IR Budget The percentage of the IR departmental 
budget allocated to IRP.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Number of Year's Experience Number of years experience held by 
senior-most IR officer.  
BNY Mellon IR Survey 
Control Variables 
Invest The sum of capital expenditures and 
research and development expenditures 
divided by total assets.  
 
Invest (alternate #1) The sum of research and development 
expenditures, the change in property 
plant and equipment (net) and the 
change in inventory.  
Chen et al. (2017) 
Invest (alternate #2) The sum of research and development 
expenditures and the change in 
property, plant and equipment (net) 
Bhandari and Javakhadze 
(2017) 
Tobin’s Q [Market value of the firm (PRCC_F × 
CSHO) minus book value of 
shareholders’ equity (CEQ) plus assets 
(AT)] divided by total assets (AT).  
 
Size Logarithm of lagged assets CRSP/Compustat 
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) The standard deviation of the logarithm 
of sales over the past three years, i.e., t, 
t-1, t-2. [std(log(SALE), log(lag1SALE), 
log(lag2sale))] 
CRSP/Compustat 
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows 
(3 year) 
The standard deviation of the logarithm 
of cash flows over the past three years, 
i.e., t, t-1, t-2. Cash flows are measured 
as net cash flow from operating 
activities (OANCF) divided by lagged 
total assets (lag1AT).  
CRSP/Compustat 
Standard Deviation of Investment 
(3 year) 
The standard deviation of the logarithm 
of sum of investment over the past 
three years. Investment is the sum of 
research and development (XRD), 
capital expenditures (CAPX), 
acquisitions (AQC).  
CRSP/Compustat 
Altman-Z Score A variable equal to: 
(1.2(ACT-
LCT)+1.4(RE+3.3×(OIADP+NOPI) 
+ SALE)) ÷ AT  
CRSP/Compustat 
Property, Plant and Equipment 
(Net) 
Property plant and equipment. [PPEGT 
/ lag1AT] 
CRSP/Compustat 
Book Leverage Long-term debt plus the current 
portion of long-term debt divided by 
lagged total assets. [(DLTT + DLC) / 
lag1AT] 
CRSP/Compustat 
Operating Cycle A variable equal to: 
Logarithm((1+RECT ÷ SALE × 
360)+(1+INVT÷COGS)×360) 
CRSP/Compustat 
Loss Dummy A dummy variable equal to one if the 




negative in the firm year and zero 
otherwise.  
 
Mean 5th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 95th Percentile St. Dev. N
Time_ExistingII 34.83 0.00 25.00 35.00 40.00 60.00 15.88 1,895
Time_NewII 27.67 0.00 20.00 30.00 35.00 50.00 13.97 1,895
Time_Individuals 1.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 4.48 1,895
Meetings_with_IRO 72.32 0.00 0.00 2.00 100.00 300.00 140.50 1,895
boardwmarketintelligence 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.48 1,895
Stock Performance 3.96 0.00 0.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 3.07 1,895
Sell Side Analyst Opinions 5.43 0.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 2.81 1,895
Peer Firm Information 1.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 7.00 2.24 1,895
Media Mentions 0.12 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.22 1,895
Investment Community Feedback 3.30 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 2.55 1,895
Industry Trends 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 2.14 1,895
Financial Performance 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 2.27 1,895
Largest Buyer Insights 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 2.88 1,895
Debriefing IR Activities 1.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 2.95 1,895
Base Salary 192.02 50.00 138.00 187.00 238.00 325.00 97.77 1,717
Bonus 71.79 0.00 18.00 62.00 125.00 225.00 65.87 1,532
Total Compensation 300.32 0.00 162.00 262.00 375.00 775.00 220.47 1,687
Total IR Budget 914,790 200,000 375,000 500,000 1,000,000 2,700,000 1,210,444 691
Salaries as % of IR Budget 44 15 30 45 57 75 19 990
Years Experience of Senior-Most IR 9.80 1.00 4.00 8.00 15.00 21.00 6.95 1,759
Table 1: Investor Relation Variables Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for survey responses. All variables defined in Appendix A. 
Firm-Years Change Distinct Firms Change
BNY Mellon Survey Data, Retrieval Stage 3,334 2,518
After removing duplicate obseravtion 3,225 (109) 2,518 0
After removing firms-years not hand-matched to Compustat 2,745 (480) 2,109 (409)
After removing non-US firm observations 432 (2,313) 358 (1,751)
After removing firms with missing control variables 412 (20) 343 (15)
After replacing missing IR variables with nearest same-firm non-missing observation 1,895 343
Table 2: Sample Selection
The columns labeled Firm -Years  and Firms count the number of observations after each of our data cuts. 
Fama-French industry code (10 industries)
Non-Durable 29 7% 151 8%
Consumer Durable 12 3% 66 3%
Manufacturing 56 14% 267 14%
Energy 24 6% 123 6%
High Tech 98 24% 454 24%
Telecommunications 8 2% 47 2%
Wholesale Retail 46 11% 195 10%
Health 32 8% 169 9%
Utiliites 55 13% 163 9%
Other 52 13% 260 14%
Total 412 100% 1,895 100%
Year Freq. % Freq. %
2008 31 8% 268 14%
2009 55 13% 272 14%
2010 95 23% 275 15%
2011 133 32% 275 15%
2012 59 14% 274 14%
2013 0 0% 267 14%
2014 39 9% 264 14%
Total 412 100% 1,895 100%
Expanded SampleRaw Data
Raw Data Expanded Sample
Table 3: Survey Firm Breakdown by Industry and Year
This table reports sample characteristics of the surveyed firms. 
Panel A: Fama-French 10 Industry Breakdown
Survey Firm-Years
Panel B: Year Breakdown
Survey Firm-
Years
Investment Tobin's Q Size
Standard 
Deviation of 













Book Leverage Cash Flows Operating Cycle Loss Indicator
Mean 0.090 1.852 7.913 0.00010 0.09832 0.01005 2.20 0.29 0.25 0.10 6.15 0.16
5th Percentile 0.010 0.917 5.189 0.00000 0.00885 0.00002 -0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.01 5.97 0.00
25th Percentile 0.035 1.186 6.823 0.00000 0.02906 0.00017 1.24 0.08 0.09 0.07 6.06 0.00
Median 0.070 1.513 7.863 0.00001 0.06083 0.00088 2.22 0.18 0.22 0.14 6.13 0.00
75th Percentile 0.115 2.144 9.080 0.00004 0.11946 0.00443 3.09 0.43 0.36 0.24 6.21 0.00
95th Percentile 0.249 3.965 10.738 0.00039 0.32043 0.04124 5.10 0.83 0.60 0.45 6.41 1.00
St. Dev. 0.086 1.111 1.686 0.00037 0.11697 0.04094 1.88 0.28 0.23 1.02 0.14 0.37
N 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895
Table 4: Sample Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for survey firm characteristics. All variables defined in Appendix A. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test Variable: Time_ExistingII Time_ExistingII Time_NewII Time_NewII Time_Individuals Time_Individuals
Tobin's Q 0.0306*** 0.0208*** 0.0217*** 0.0240*** 0.0292*** 0.0289***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.00982 0.244*** 0.0296 0.173*** 0.0472
(0.89) (0.00) (0.67) (0.01) (0.12)
Test Variable 0.000181 0.000229 -0.000456 0.0000268
(0.54) (0.37) (0.14) (0.92)




(0.41) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Test Variable × Cash Flow -0.00727*** -0.00531** -0.00586***-0.00346** 











Size -0.00482*** -0.00575*** -0.00514***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 12.77 5.216 5.894
(0.16) (0.53) (0.58)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) 0.00413 0.00286 0.00909
(0.76) (0.84) (0.52)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.164 0.123 0.126
(0.11) (0.22) (0.35)
Altman Z Score -0.0135*** -0.0130*** -0.0138***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.111***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Book Leverage -0.0627*** -0.0643*** -0.0580***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Operating Cycle 0.0504*** 0.0498*** 0.0518***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Indicator 0.0205*** 0.0203*** 0.0200***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0381*** -0.245** 0.0560*** -0.226** 0.0420*** -0.239**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Number of Observations 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.172 0.437 0.183 0.437 0.185 0.435
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table 5: The Impact of IR Department Time with Investors on Investment Efficiency
"Please think about all the time spent with the investment community by the investor relations department, approximately what percentage of this time is allocated to existing (new) institutional 
investors [individual investors]."
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p -values are presented 
underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where 
we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: Meetings_with_IRO Meetings_with_IRO






Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.00272**
(0.02)











Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 8.878
(0.41)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.00237
(0.86)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.130
(0.33)
Altman Z Score -0.0130***
(0.00)










Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.188 0.437
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Table 6: The Impact of One-On-One Meetings with Investment Professionals on Investment Efficiency
"What is your best estimate as to the number of one-on-one meetings IR personnel have with investment 
professionals in a typical year?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the 
top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates
statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: boardwmarketintelligence boardwmarketintelligence





Test Variable × Tobin's Q

















Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 9.247
(0.41)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) 0.00377
(0.79)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.132
(0.34)
Altman Z Score -0.0137***
(0.00)










Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.172 0.430
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Table 7: The Impact of Market Intelligence Provided by IR Department to the Board of Directors
"Does the investor relations department provide the Board of Directors with market intelligence (Yes / No)?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the 
top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient 
estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Test Variable: Stock Performance Sell Side Analyst Opinions Peer Firm Information Media Mentions
Investment Community 
Feedback Industry Trends Financial Performance Largest Buyer Insights Debriefing IR Activities
Tobin's Q 0.0194*** 0.0256*** 0.0251*** 0.0303*** 0.0328*** 0.0266*** 0.0275*** 0.0310*** 0.0277***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows 0.124** 0.170** 0.0679** 0.0203 0.0456 0.0550* 0.0409 0.0351
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.47) (0.48) (0.06) (0.16) (0.29)
Test Variable -0.00272* 0.000177 -0.00483* 0.000101 -0.00311
(0.07) (0.92) (0.06) (0.96) (0.21)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.00295*** 0.00103 0.00350** 0.00351**
(0.00) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02)




































Size -0.00512*** -0.00496*** -0.00454*** -0.00513*** -0.00497*** -0.00496*** -0.00522*** -0.00506*** -0.00513***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 6.412 8.674 10.15 7.738 7.487 14.13 9.122 7.778 9.410
(0.49) (0.37) (0.37) (0.49) (0.50) (0.23) (0.42) (0.48) (0.40)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) 0.00399 0.00336 0.00838 0.00465 0.00513 -0.000345 0.000510 0.00460 0.00297
(0.77) (0.81) (0.55) (0.74) (0.71) (0.98) (0.97) (0.74) (0.83)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.158 0.151 0.161 0.130 0.105 0.141 0.154 0.107 0.145
(0.17) (0.20) (0.24) (0.36) (0.44) (0.30) (0.27) (0.44) (0.30)
Altman Z Score -0.0131*** -0.0133*** -0.0136*** -0.0132*** -0.0137*** -0.0132*** -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0134***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.111***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Book Leverage -0.0663*** -0.0637*** -0.0585*** -0.0593*** -0.0622*** -0.0569*** -0.0571*** -0.0632*** -0.0603***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Operating Cycle 0.0397*** 0.0461*** 0.0553*** 0.0453*** 0.0488*** 0.0533*** 0.0487*** 0.0456*** 0.0475***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Indicator 0.0197*** 0.0213*** 0.0190*** 0.0198*** 0.0209*** 0.0186*** 0.0177*** 0.0207*** 0.0190***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.157 -0.209** -0.261*** -0.201** -0.225** -0.249*** -0.219** -0.201** -0.211**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Number of Observations 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.442 0.435 0.445 0.433 0.428 0.447 0.439 0.427 0.435
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Investment
Table 8: The Impact of Management to Investor Contact on Investment Efficiency
"What type(s) of market intelligence does the investor relations department provide to the Board of Directors?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Number of Year's 
Experience
Number of Year's 
Experience
Tobin's Q 0.0238 0.0262** 0.0405*** 0.0154** 0.0389*** 0.0303*** -0.0515 0.0264*** 0.0181*** 0.0369*** 0.0351***
(0.13) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.486** -0.236 -0.119 0.337*** -0.530*** -0.125 0.610 -0.259** 0.0398 -0.140 0.00266
(0.03) (0.14) (0.46) (0.01) (0.00) (0.34) (0.30) (0.03) (0.51) (0.10) (0.97)
Test Variable -0.00882*** 0.00361 0.00195 -0.00663*** -0.000365 0.000536 0.000427
(0.00) (0.30) (0.50) (0.01) (0.32) (0.46) (0.53)




(0.30) (0.18) (0.07) (0.66) (0.85) (0.03) (0.46)





























Size -0.00577*** -0.00365*** -0.00501*** -0.00572***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 13.27 18.98 10.37 14.01
(0.26) (0.35) (0.37) (0.32)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) 0.00598 0.00285 0.00377 0.00731
(0.68) (0.85) (0.80) (0.62)
















Altman Z Score -0.0129*** -0.0116*** -0.0137*** -0.00826*** -0.0130***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.111***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Book Leverage -0.0609*** -0.0507*** -0.0604*** -0.0902*** -0.0634***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)


















(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Indicator 0.0220*** 0.0177*** 0.0218*** 0.0293*** 0.0247*** 0.0211***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant 0.101*** -0.212** 0.0350** -0.373*** 0.0787*** -0.150 0.135* -0.701*** 0.0679*** -0.268** 0.0383*** -0.250**
(0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
Number of Observations 1717 1717 1532 1532 1687 1687 691 691 990 990 1759 1759
Adjusted R-Squared 0.195 0.459 0.155 0.471 0.204 0.462 0.133 0.439 0.172 0.492 0.188 0.456
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table 9: The Impact of Investor Relations Resources on Investment Efficiency
What is the level of IR compensation and resources?
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test Variable: Time_ExistingII Time_ExistingII Time_NewII Time_NewII Time_Individuals Time_Individuals
Tobin's Q 0.0314*** 0.0327*** 0.0349*** 0.0410*** 0.0413*** 0.0406***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.423 -0.472 -0.228 -0.208 -0.485*
(0.17) (0.30) (0.27) (0.41) (0.07)
Test Variable 0.0000696 0.000697
(0.93) (0.37)




























Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -2.344 -9.257
(0.91) (0.66)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.108 -0.111
(0.32) (0.30)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0175 -0.00251
(0.92) (0.99)
Altman Z Score 0.0122 0.0140
(0.30) (0.25)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.126*** 0.129***
(0.00) (0.00)
Book Leverage 0.0543 0.0555
(0.28) (0.27)
Operating Cycle 0.0897** 0.0973***
(0.03) (0.01)


























Constant 0.00825 -0.478* -0.000139 -0.534** -0.00176 -0.567**
(0.81) (0.10) (1.00) (0.03) (0.90) (0.02)
Number of Observations 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.116 0.162 0.120 0.169 0.123 0.169
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table A1: The Impact of IR Department Time with Investors on Investment Efficiency
"Please think about all the time spent with the investment community by the investor relations department, approximately what percentage of this time is allocated to existing (new) institutional 
investors [individual investors]."
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented 
underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where 
we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: Meetings_with_IRO Meetings_with_IRO
Tobin's Q 0.0366*** 0.0330***
(0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.403*** -0.452*
(0.00) (0.05)
Test Variable -0.000769 -0.00476
(0.89) (0.34)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.00423** 0.00606***
(0.02) (0.01)






Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -0.241
(0.99)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.110
(0.29)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0802
(0.69)
Altman Z Score 0.0114
(0.29)










Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.121 0.169
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Table A2: The Impact of One-On-One Meetings with Investment Professionals on Investment Efficiency
"What is your best estimate as to the number of one-on-one meetings IR personnel have with investment professionals in a typical year?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables 
are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: boardwmarketintelligence boardwmarketintelligence




Test Variable × Tobin's Q




















Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 8.447
(0.75)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.102
(0.32)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0944
(0.65)
Altman Z Score 0.00889
(0.32)










Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.144 0.191
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Table A3: The Impact of Market Intelligence Provided by IR Department to the Board of Directors
"Does the investor relations department provide the Board of Directors with market intelligence (Yes / No)?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Test Variable: Stock Performance Sell Side Analyst Opinions Peer Firm Information Media Mentions
Investment Community 
Feedback Industry Trends Financial Performance Largest Buyer Insights Debriefing IR Activities
Tobin's Q 0.0334*** 0.0526*** 0.0366*** 0.0461*** 0.0437*** 0.0424*** 0.0450*** 0.0473*** 0.0348***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.605* -0.646* -0.310***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.00)
Test Variable -0.00415 0.00391
(0.29) (0.61)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.0000276 0.00363**
(0.50) (0.02)




























































(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -7.022 -4.044 1.226 -4.157 -5.151 -3.932 -5.418 -6.229 1.678
(0.74) (0.85) (0.97) (0.83) (0.81) (0.87) (0.79) (0.77) (0.95)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.121 -0.115 -0.0941 -0.110 -0.116 -0.111 -0.108 -0.115 -0.0984
(0.28) (0.29) (0.32) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.33)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0668 -0.00513 0.143 -0.0357 0.0261 0.00858 -0.0452 -0.0552 0.158
(0.69) (0.98) (0.51) (0.87) (0.88) (0.97) (0.84) (0.80) (0.50)
Altman Z Score 0.0137 0.0125 0.0106 0.0126 0.0122 0.0124 0.0124 0.0128 0.00827
(0.27) (0.30) (0.23) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.122***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Book Leverage 0.0559 0.0569 0.0712 0.0557 0.0545 0.0592 0.0537 0.0548 0.0610
(0.27) (0.26) (0.15) (0.27) (0.28) (0.23) (0.29) (0.27) (0.22)
Operating Cycle 0.0926** 0.0994*** 0.114*** 0.0874** 0.102*** 0.0953** 0.0858** 0.0837** 0.116***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00)
Loss Indicator -0.0218 -0.0238 -0.0208 -0.0259 -0.0209 -0.0273 -0.0270 -0.0238 -0.0268
(0.38) (0.37) (0.36) (0.34) (0.38) (0.32) (0.32) (0.37) (0.30)
Constant
Number of Observations -0.518** -0.566** -0.665*** -0.464* -0.588** -0.512* -0.448 -0.442 -0.651***
Adjusted R-Squared (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.00)
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Firm Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
"What type(s) of market intelligence does the investor relations department provide to the Board of Directors?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Investment
Table A4: The Impact of Management to Investor Contact on Investment Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Number of Year's 
Experience
Number of Year's 
Experience
Tobin's Q 0.0764 0.0813 0.0573*** 0.0318 0.00766 0.00297 0.0344 0.0272*** 0.00982 0.0529*** 0.0540***
(0.19) (0.26) (0.00) (0.16) (0.77) (0.89) (0.74) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -1.486 -1.572 -0.273* 0.0335 -1.447 -0.280 -0.0134 -0.669*** -0.765**
(0.15) (0.21) (0.10) (0.84) (0.27) (0.14) (0.94) (0.01) (0.04)
Test Variable -0.0112 -0.00834 0.00706 0.00607 -0.00590 -0.000605 -0.000468 -0.000846
(0.28) (0.38) (0.40) (0.47) (0.58) (0.33) (0.80) (0.64)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q -0.00547 -0.00609 0.000701 -0.000456
-0.000317 
(0.60) 
0.000397** 0.000915*** -0.000508 -0.000461
(0.62) (0.64) (0.45) (0.95) (0.05) (0.00) (0.57) (0.64)


































Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -16.50 12.48 21.54 15.16 -22.73
(0.62) (0.63) (0.62) (0.47) (0.50)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.113 -0.0133 0.0198 0.0244 -0.104
(0.32) (0.89) (0.89) (0.86) (0.34)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.177 0.598* 0.568 0.288 0.232
(0.26) (0.09) (0.35) (0.29) (0.14)
Altman Z Score 0.0140 0.00356 -0.000456 -0.00497 0.0130
(0.26) (0.55) (0.93) (0.31) (0.29)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.0990** 0.145** 0.138***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00)
Book Leverage 0.0622 0.0903 -0.00935 0.0411 0.0548
(0.26) (0.11) (0.82) (0.17) (0.31)
Operating Cycle 0.1000** 0.149*** 0.158** 0.156*** 0.0930**
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Loss Indicator -0.0218 -0.00984 -0.0243 -0.0122 -0.0235
(0.48) (0.67) (0.31) (0.70) (0.45)
Constant 0.0581 -0.499 -0.0327 -0.922*** 0.0226 0.139 -0.888* 0.00501 -0.904*** 0.00732 -0.485*




























(0.10) (0.28) (0.06) (0.88) (0.01) (0.80) (0.09)
Number of Observations 1717 1717 1532 1532 1687 1687 691 691 990 990 1759 1759
Adjusted R-Squared 0.130 0.182 0.085 0.162 0.127 0.176 0.067 0.124 0.085 0.164 0.125 0.176
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table A5: The Impact of Investor Relations Resources on Investment Efficiency
What is the level of IR compensation and resources?
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test Variable: Time_ExistingII Time_ExistingII Time_NewII Time_NewII Time_Individuals Time_Individuals
Tobin's Q 0.0316*** 0.0319*** 0.0344*** 0.0395*** 0.0393*** 0.0385***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.413 -0.432 -0.235 -0.205 -0.439*
(0.13) (0.29) (0.20) (0.37) (0.06)
Test Variable 0.0000115 0.0000974 0.000617
(0.99) (0.89) (0.36)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.000382* 0.000318 0.000165
(0.08) (0.13) (0.28)























Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -0.580 -6.760
(0.98) (0.73)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.0611 -0.0641
(0.52) (0.50)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.000985 -0.0170
(1.00) (0.91)
Altman Z Score 0.00974 0.0113
(0.36) (0.31)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.111*** 0.113***
(0.01) (0.01)
Book Leverage 0.0450 0.0463
(0.36) (0.35)























Loss Indicator -0.0175 -0.0187 -0.0187
(0.50) (0.47) (0.46)
Constant 0.0102 -0.429* 0.00145 -0.478** 0.00193 -0.510**
(0.74) (0.10) (0.95) (0.03) (0.88) (0.02)
Number of Observations 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.130 0.170 0.133 0.177 0.138 0.178
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table A6: The Impact of IR Department Time with Investors on Investment Efficiency
"Please think about all the time spent with the investment community by the investor relations department, approximately what percentage of this time is allocated to existing (new) institutional 
investors [individual investors]."
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented 
underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where 
we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: Meetings_with_IRO Meetings_with_IRO
Tobin's Q 0.0344*** 0.0308***
(0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.392*** -0.416**
(0.00) (0.04)
Test Variable -0.00224 -0.00552
(0.65) (0.22)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.00456*** 0.00612***
(0.01) (0.00)






Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 1.602
(0.94)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.0646
(0.48)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0626
(0.74)
Altman Z Score 0.00910
(0.36)










Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.135 0.178
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Table A7: The Impact of One-On-One Meetings with Investment Professionals on Investment Efficiency
"What is your best estimate as to the number of one-on-one meetings IR personnel have with investment professionals in a typical year?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables 
are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: boardwmarketintelligence boardwmarketintelligence




Test Variable × Tobin's Q




















Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) 8.966
(0.71)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.0563
(0.54)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0712
(0.72)
Altman Z Score 0.00682
(0.41)










Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.155 0.198
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Table A8: The Impact of Market Intelligence Provided by IR Department to the Board of Directors
"Does the investor relations department provide the Board of Directors with market intelligence (Yes / No)?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Test Variable: Stock Performance Sell Side Analyst Opinions Peer Firm Information Media Mentions
Investment Community 
Feedback Industry Trends Financial Performance Largest Buyer Insights Debriefing IR Activities
Tobin's Q 0.0320*** 0.0494*** 0.0347*** 0.0438*** 0.0416*** 0.0400*** 0.0422*** 0.0446*** 0.0334***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -0.551* -0.523* -0.590*
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Test Variable




















































Size -0.0140*** -0.0141*** -0.0142*** -0.0140*** -0.0140*** -0.0144*** -0.0140***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -4.927 -2.103 -2.361 -3.148 -1.572 -3.028 -3.925
(0.80) (0.92) (0.90) (0.87) (0.94) (0.88) (0.85)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.0730 -0.0674 -0.0631 -0.0685 -0.0634 -0.0614 -0.0669
(0.46) (0.48) (0.51) (0.48) (0.50) (0.51) (0.49)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0470 -0.0164 -0.0447 0.00989 -0.00393 -0.0478 -0.0627
(0.76) (0.93) (0.83) (0.95) (0.98) (0.82) (0.76)
Altman Z Score 0.0111 0.0100 0.0100 0.00975 0.00991 0.0100 0.0103
(0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Book Leverage 0.0465 0.0473 0.0467 0.0453 0.0499 0.0452 0.0454
(0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.31) (0.36) (0.36)
Operating Cycle 0.0834** 0.0895*** 0.0794** 0.0926*** 0.0860** 0.0780** 0.0756**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)























































Number of Observations -0.463** -0.508** -0.602*** -0.419* -0.530*** -0.458* -0.404* -0.396 -0.579***
Adjusted R-Squared (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.00)
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Firm Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
"What type(s) of market intelligence does the investor relations department provide to the Board of Directors?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Investment
Table A9: The Impact of Management to Investor Contact on Investment Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Number of Year's 
Experience
Number of Year's 
Experience
Tobin's Q 0.0769 0.0799 0.0583*** 0.0363* 0.0148 0.00909 0.0513 0.0230*** 0.00785 0.0530*** 0.0530***
(0.15) (0.23) (0.00) (0.09) (0.55) (0.66) (0.58) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows -1.451 -1.482 -0.322** -0.0475 -0.203 -0.151 -1.218 -0.304* -0.0521 -0.630*** -0.691**
(0.12) (0.20) (0.04) (0.77) (0.56) (0.51) (0.27) (0.06) (0.71) (0.00) (0.04)
Test Variable -0.0101 -0.00721 0.00647 0.00553 -0.00255 -0.000761 0.000213 -0.000132
(0.31) (0.43) (0.43) (0.50) (0.79) (0.17) (0.90) (0.94)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q -0.00592 -0.00637 -0.00519 -0.00185
-0.000492 
(0.34) 
0.000435** 0.000917*** -0.000703 -0.000630
(0.56) (0.59) (0.30) (0.79) (0.03) (0.00) (0.41) (0.49)






































Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -10.10 4.818 -2.559 14.88 5.717 -15.34
(0.74) (0.84) (0.93) (0.72) (0.76) (0.61)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.0652 0.0171 -0.0682 0.0290 0.0706 -0.0574
(0.51) (0.84) (0.49) (0.81) (0.55) (0.55)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.143 0.518 0.242 0.601 0.283 0.191
(0.31) (0.14) (0.12) (0.29) (0.26) (0.18)
Altman Z Score 0.0113 0.00228 0.0105 -0.00216 -0.00606 0.0104
(0.32) (0.70) (0.37) (0.62) (0.17) (0.35)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.125*** 0.111*** 0.120*** 0.0852** 0.130** 0.123***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00)
Book Leverage 0.0535 0.0776 0.0580 -0.0297 0.0201 0.0462
(0.33) (0.16) (0.28) (0.42) (0.46) (0.39)
Operating Cycle 0.0913** 0.130*** 0.0799** 0.149*** 0.134*** 0.0840**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Loss Indicator -0.0139 -0.00127 -0.0139 -0.00513 0.00348 -0.0152
(0.62) (0.95) (0.63) (0.80) (0.90) (0.60)
Constant 0.0544 -0.455* -0.0273 -0.798*** 0.0267 -0.420 0.107 -0.883** 0.0186 -0.769*** 0.00296 -0.442*
(0.29) (0.09) (0.43) (0.00) (0.28) (0.10) (0.36) (0.02) (0.51) (0.01) (0.91) (0.08)
Number of Observations 1717 1717 1532 1532 1687 1687 691 691 990 990 1759 1759
Adjusted R-Squared 0.145 0.192 0.097 0.170 0.141 0.185 0.085 0.147 0.100 0.178 0.140 0.185
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table A10: The Impact of Investor Relations Resources on Investment Efficiency
What is the level of IR compensation and resources?
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3)
Test Variable: Time_ExistingII Time_NewII Time_Individuals
Tobin's Q 0.0119** 0.0250*** 0.0252***
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows 0.383*** 0.0705 0.0494
(0.00) (0.34) (0.14)
Test Variable 0.000345 -0.000235 -0.00111
(0.19) (0.44) (0.28)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.000408** 0.00000197 -0.000175
(0.02) (0.50) (0.77)
Test Variable × Cash Flow -0.00926*** 0.000158 0.0129
(0.00) (0.95) (0.24)
Board Size -0.00208*** -0.00210*** -0.00228***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Board Independence -0.000244 -0.000205 -0.000275*
(0.11) (0.19) (0.08)
Coopted Board Members 0.0000565 0.0000301 0.0000259
(0.27) (0.56) (0.61)
Board Director Busyness 0.000160** 0.000187** 0.000189**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant -0.417*** -0.354*** -0.356***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 1662 1662 1662
Adjusted R-Squared 0.416 0.403 0.405
Control Variables Included: Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm
Table A11: The Impact of IR Department Time with Investors on Investment Efficiency
"Please think about all the time spent with the investment community by the investor relations department, 
approximately what percentage of this time is allocated to existing (new) institutional investors [individual investors]."
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of 
each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance 











Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.00290***
(0.01)






Coopted Board Members 0.00000334
(0.95)




Number of Observations 1662
Adjusted R-Squared 0.416
Control Variables Included: Yes
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm
Table A12: The Impact of One-On-One Meetings with Investment Professionals on Investment Efficiency
"What is your best estimate as to the number of one-on-one meetings IR personnel have with investment 
professionals in a typical year?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at 
the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient 
estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** 










Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.0148***
(0.01)






Coopted Board Members 0.0000278
(0.58)




Number of Observations 1662
Adjusted R-Squared 0.411
Control Variables Included: Yes
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm
Table A13: The Impact of Market Intelligence Provided by IR Department to the Board of Directors
"Does the investor relations department provide the Board of Directors with market intelligence (Yes / No)?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top 
of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Test Variable: Stock Performance Sell Side Analyst Opinions Peer Firm Information Media Mentions
Investment Community 
Feedback Industry Trends Financial Performance Largest Buyer Insights Debriefing IR Activities
Tobin's Q 0.0105*** 0.0141** 0.0176*** 0.0258*** 0.0126*** 0.0206*** 0.0201*** 0.0199*** 0.0199***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cash Flows 0.256*** 0.381*** 0.152*** 0.0757** 0.324*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.130***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Test Variable -0.00166 0.00170 -0.00321 0.000714 -0.000494 -0.00288** -0.00191
(0.26) (0.36) (0.11) (0.66) (0.78) (0.04) (0.18)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.00327*** 0.00169** 0.00379*** 0.00293***
-0.00294 
(0.18) 





(0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)








Board Size -0.00208*** -0.00215*** -0.00196*** -0.00230*** -0.00170** -0.00249*** -0.00242*** -0.00243*** -0.00227***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Board Independence -0.000312** -0.000216 -0.000285* -0.000256* -0.000307** -0.000196 -0.000247 -0.000265* -0.000279*
(0.04) (0.16) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.21) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06)
Coopted Board Members 0.0000296 0.0000138 0.0000369 0.0000245 0.0000312 0.0000280 0.0000253 0.0000243 0.0000225
(0.57) (0.79) (0.46) (0.63) (0.54) (0.58) (0.61) (0.63) (0.65)
Board Director Busyness 0.000150* 0.000166** 0.000171** 0.000193** 0.000148* 0.000174** 0.000173** 0.000200** 0.000194**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Contant -0.324*** -0.390*** -0.463*** -0.356*** -0.422*** -0.416*** -0.399*** -0.388*** -0.394***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 1662 1662 1662 1662 1662 1662 1662 1662 1662
Adjusted R-Squared 0.422 0.421 0.432 0.403 0.430 0.418 0.424 0.417 0.418
Control Variables Included: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table A14: The Impact of Management to Investor Contact on Investment Efficiency
"What type(s) of market intelligence does the investor relations department provide to the Board of Directors?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Tobin's Q 0.00467 0.00892* 0.00493 0.0158*** 0.0205***
(0.61) (0.09) (0.48) (0.01) (0.00)
Cash Flows 0.0952 0.468*** 0.275*** 0.0129 0.236***
(0.46) (0.00) (0.01) (0.78) (0.00)
Test Variable 0.00296 -0.00415** 0.000867
(0.29) (0.03) (0.15)







(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08)














Board Size -0.00186** -0.00140* -0.00195*** -0.00324*** -0.00314*** -0.00192**
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Board Independence -0.000292* -0.000422** -0.000196 -0.000730*** -0.000122 -0.000297*
(0.06) (0.02) (0.20) (0.00) (0.54) (0.06)
Coopted Board Members 0.0000140 -0.00000181 0.00000683 0.000132 -0.00000596 0.0000400
(0.79) (0.97) (0.90) (0.11) (0.92) (0.45)
Board Director Busyness 0.000124 0.000149* 0.000147* 0.000175 0.000137 0.0000842
(0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.19) (0.31)
Constant -0.334*** -0.439*** -0.268*** -0.694*** -0.408*** -0.406***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 1535 1422 1505 624 906 1577
Adjusted R-Squared 0.412 0.447 0.413 0.512 0.423 0.421
Control Variables Included: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Dependent Variable: Investment
Table A15: The Impact of Investor Relations Resources on Investment Efficiency
What is the level of IR compensation and resources?
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-
tailed otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test Variable: Time_ExistingII Time_ExistingII Time_NewII Time_NewII Time_Individuals Time_Individuals
Tobin's Q 0.0105 0.00873 0.0156 0.0151 0.0144*** 0.0128**
(0.25) (0.27) (0.15) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01)
Cash Flows 0.0269 0.0558 -0.0153 -0.0117 0.0117 0.0188
(0.72) (0.41) (0.87) (0.90) (0.76) (0.56)
Test Variable -0.000257 -0.000176 0.00399 0.00367
(0.28) (0.68) (0.66) (0.63)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q
-0.000277 
(0.34) 
0.000262** 0.000242** 0.0000371 0.000962 0.000818
(0.04) (0.03) (0.44) (0.20) (0.22)












Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -7.442
(0.48)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.0297**
(0.02)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0179
(0.83)
Altman Z Score 0.00283
(0.64)















































Number of Observations 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.816 0.839 0.815 0.838 0.817 0.839
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Firm Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A16: The Impact of IR Department Time with Investors on Investment Efficiency
"Please think about all the time spent with the investment community by the investor relations department, approximately what percentage of this time is allocated to existing (new) institutional 
investors [individual investors]."
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented 
underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where 
we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: Meetings_with_IRO Meetings_with_IRO
Tobin's Q 0.00965* 0.00875
(0.08) (0.10)
Cash Flows 0.0188 0.0277
(0.73) (0.54)
Test Variable
Test Variable × Tobin's Q








Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year)
Altman Z Score

























Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.820 0.841
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Firm Fixed Effects: Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes
Table A17: The Impact of One-On-One Meetings with Investment Professionals on Investment Efficiency
"What is your best estimate as to the number of one-on-one meetings IR personnel have with investment 
professionals in a typical year?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the 
top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates
statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Investment Dependent Variable: Investment
Test Variable: boardwmarketintelligence boardwmarketintelligence
Tobin's Q 0.00921** 0.00737
(0.04) (0.11)
Cash Flows 0.0693 0.0853*
(0.22) (0.10)
Test Variable
Test Variable × Tobin's Q








Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year)













Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.0332
(0.62)
Altman Z Score 0.00179
(0.73)








Number of Observations 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.825 0.847
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Firm Fixed Effects: Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes
Table A18: The Impact of Market Intelligence Provided by IR Department to the Board of Directors
"Does the investor relations department provide the Board of Directors with market intelligence (Yes / No)?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the 
top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient 
estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Test Variable: Stock Performance Sell Side Analyst Opinions Peer Firm Information Media Mentions
Investment Community 
Feedback Industry Trends Financial Performance Largest Buyer Insights Debriefing IR Activities
Tobin's Q 0.00376 0.00133 0.00592 0.00991*** 0.0213* 0.00679* 0.00751* 0.0164* 0.00757*
(0.21) (0.78) (0.11) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Cash Flows 0.0970 0.198 0.0652 0.0362 -0.0187 0.0587* 0.0592 -0.00440 0.0788*
(0.21) (0.14) (0.18) (0.32) (0.86) (0.10) (0.11) (0.94) (0.10)
Test Variable -0.00114 -0.00640* -0.0227** 0.00185 -0.00705** -0.00360 -0.00235
(0.61) (0.06) (0.02) (0.46) (0.02) (0.23) (0.46)
Test Variable × Tobin's Q 0.00275** 0.00632** 0.00784*** -0.00203 0.00766*** 0.00532** -0.000424





Test Variable × Cash Flow 0.00548 -0.0315*** -0.0302*** 0.000232
(0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.98)
Size -0.0205 -0.0126 -0.0125 -0.0192
(0.10) (0.22) (0.22) (0.11)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year) -7.304 -4.552 -6.349 -7.863
(0.51) (0.64) (0.52) (0.46)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year) -0.0303** -0.0317*** -0.0305** -0.0293**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year) 0.00834 0.0417 0.0471 0.0165
(0.92) (0.47) (0.51) (0.84)
Altman Z Score 0.00367 0.00378 0.00326 0.00298
(0.54) (0.49) (0.55) (0.63)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.140***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Book Leverage 0.00536 0.0106 0.0106 0.00470
(0.79) (0.57) (0.57) (0.82)
Operating Cycle 0.00269 -0.0289 -0.0162 0.00870
(0.96) (0.43) (0.69) (0.89)









































































































Number of Observations 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 1895
Adjusted R-Squared 0.844 0.844 0.852 0.854 0.839 0.858 0.851 0.838 0.850
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Firm Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
"What type(s) of market intelligence does the investor relations department provide to the Board of Directors?"
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Investment
Table A19: The Impact of Management to Investor Contact on Investment Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Salaries as % of 
IR Budget
Number of Year's 
Experience
Number of Year's 
Experience
Tobin's Q 0.0104 0.00673 0.00557 -0.00169 0.00968 0.00715 0.00284 -0.00783 -0.00583 0.00870 0.00247
(0.53) (0.64) (0.39) (0.79) (0.49) (0.58) (0.97) (0.53) (0.60) (0.16) (0.72)
Cash Flows -0.0322 0.305** 0.325** -1.105 0.126 0.186 0.0657 0.0896
(0.87) (0.04) (0.03) (0.15) (0.38) (0.21) (0.52) (0.39)
Test Variable 0.00284 0.00194 0.000414 0.00103** -0.00182
(0.43) (0.54) (0.37) (0.05) (0.19)




(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)






























Standard Deviation of Cash Flows (3 year)
Standard Deviation of Sales (3 year)
Standard Deviation of Investment (3 year)
Altman Z Score














































































































































Number of Observations 1717 1717 1532 1532 1687 1687 691 691 990 990 1759 1759
Adjusted R-Squared 0.811 0.835 0.818 0.848 0.804 0.829 0.829 0.852 0.808 0.833 0.816 0.841
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Firm Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A20: The Impact of Investor Relations Resources on Investment Efficiency
What is the level of IR compensation and resources?
This table reports results from regressions of investment on firm characteristics including our test variables specified at the top of each column. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, one-tailed where we have predictions, two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Investment
